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113,49 €
Self-Knowing Agents
102,14 € 
- Mēs nosūtīsim 10-14 darba dienu laikā.
Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of…
102.14
2025-06-02 08:00:00
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- Autors: Lucy O'Brien
- Izdevējs Clarendon Press
- ISBN-10 : 0199261482
- ISBN-13 : 9780199261482
- Formāts: 14 x 21.6 x 1.8 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Valoda: Anglų
- Extra -10% atlaide, ievadot kodu: EXTRA
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Apraksts
Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.10 EXTRA % atlaide
102,14 €
113,49 €
Mēs nosūtīsim 10-14 darba dienu laikā.
Kupona kods: EXTRA
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- Autors: Lucy O'Brien
- Izdevējs Clarendon Press
- ISBN-10: 0199261482
- ISBN-13: 9780199261482
- Formāts 14 x 21.6 x 1.8 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Valoda: Anglų
Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.
Atsauksmes